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Topical Review
Symptom perception, placebo effects, and the
Bayesian brain
Giulio Ongaroa,*, Ted J. Kaptchukb,c
1. Introduction
The standard and ideal biomedical model of symptom perception
treats the brain largely as a passive stimulus-driven organ. It
embraces the notion that the brain absorbs sensory signals from
the body and converts them, directly, into conscious experience.
Accordingly, biomedicine operates under the assumption that
symptoms are the direct consequences of physiological dys-
function and improvement is the direct consequence of the
restoration of bodily function. Despite its success, the biomedical
model has failed to provide an adequate account of 2 well-
demonstrated phenomena in medicine: (1) the experience of
symptoms without pathophysiological disruption, and (2) the
experience of relief after the administration of placebo treatments.
This topical review advances the idea that “predictive process-
ing,” a Bayesian approach to perception that is rapidly taking hold
in neuroscience, significantly helps accommodating these 2
phenomena. It expands on recent high-quality empirical work on
predictive processing1,7,19,24 and outlines, more broadly, how
Bayesian models offer an altogether different picture of how the
brain perceives symptoms and relief.
2. The Bayesian brain
The nervous system is constantly dealing with a continuous and
potentially overwhelming stream of varying signals coming from
our body and senses. For the sake of adaptation, the brain must
turn this confused play of sensory inputs and neural firings into
a reliable perception of the world. Debate in cognitive science has
revolved around how exactly the brain accomplishes this task.
While previous theories, in line with the current biomedical model
of disease, viewed perception mostly as a bottom-up readout of
sensory signals, emerging Bayesian models suggest, instead,
that perception is cognitively (mostly nonconsciously) modulated,
andmight be best viewed as a process of prediction, based on an
integration of sensory inputs, prior experience, and contextual
cues.9,10,15,21
The key suggestion is that to perceive the world, the brain
follows a theory of probability known as Bayes rule. In its
mathematical form, the rule updates the likelihood of a given
hypothesis (or “prior”), given some evidence, by considering the
product of the likelihood and the prior probability of the
hypothesis.21 Over rapid time scales, the brain implements
Bayes rule by continuously generating a top-down cascade of
neurally encoded (mostly nonconscious) hypotheses about the
state of the body and world. This top-down flow of hypotheses is
met by the bottom-up stream of sensory inputs coming from the
senses. Any mismatch between predicted input and actual input
results in “prediction error,” which prompts the system to revise
its hypotheses. Bottom-up perception is thus inseparable from
top-down prediction. Some of the hypotheses that account for
the most abstract and general features of the world are “built-in”
by evolution; others are amenable to progressive refinement
through developmental learning. Throughout one’s lifespan, the
nervous system engages in the continuous updating of these
priors to better predict the next incoming sensory inputs and
minimize error.
A central implication of the theory is that what we perceive is
not the world as it actually is, but the brain’s best guess of it,
continuously refined by incoming sensory evidence.10,21 Visual
perception, the domain from which much of the evidence for the
Bayesian brain has emerged, offers the most intuitive way to
grasp its key principle. To mention a simplistic example, sticks in
a forest that is infested by snakes might at first be perceived as
snakes, until we get a more refined view that updates the
hypothesis.
Importantly, the interplay between descending predictions and
ascending signals that lie at the heart of predictive processing is
flexibly modulated by the “precision” (or “inverse variance,” in
statistical terms) of hypotheses and sensory evidence. Faced with
the task of determining how likely a given set of inputs represents
a predicted state, the brain uses prior experience and subtle
contextual cues to determine their precision. The example of
seeing sticks as snakes represents a case where highly precise
hypotheses shapedbypreviousexperience (knowingwhat a snake
looks like, knowing that snakes inhabit the forest) override
imprecise visual inputs. Indeed, the Bayesian brain model is able
to explain how, in contexts of precise predictions and imprecise
inputs, perceptions can deviate from the actual state of the
world.10,33 Conversely, it also elucidates how inferences can be
made under conditions of ambiguity that lack precise esti-
mates.17,28 The model is supported by growing computational
and neuroimaging evidence, and advances the notion that the
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precision of descending predictions might be “encoded” in the
brain by neurotransmitters such as dopamine.16
3. Symptom perception and “medically
unexplained symptoms”
The idea that what we perceive is not the world as it is but our own
best hypothesis of it equally applies to the body2,27 and subjective
bodily states such as medical symptoms. We do not necessarily
feel pain—this framework suggests—because we “sense” it
directly from the peripheral body. To put it emphatically, we feel
pain because we predict that we are in pain, based on an
integration of sensory inputs, prior experience, and contextual
cues.
The experience of symptoms arises out of the inference that
the body has deviated from the physiological constants that
define health. From a Bayesian perspective, the experience of
health depends on the fact that we maintain a general “healthy
body condition” hypothesis (partly determined by evolution, partly
by development) that explains away a certain range of normal
variations in somatic input (eg, variations in heartbeat frequency,
bodily aches, etc.).30 So long as these variations are kept within
the bounds predicted by the “healthy body condition” hypothesis,
the brain treats them as “noise” and no symptom is perceived.
When, due to a disrupting cause such as disease, the variation of
somatic inputs is too large to be successfully predicted by the
general hypothesis and prediction error increases, the brain must
generate another hypothesis that accounts for the new evidence.
According to the theory, we feel symptoms, including pain, when
the hypothesis with the lowest prediction error represents an
abnormal somatic event.30 This framing ultimately shows that
pathophysiology may be only loosely coupled with symptoms
perception because the latter is mediated by internally generated
hypotheses about the causes of inputs, not solely determined by
inputs themselves. The degree of the correlation between
pathophysiology and symptoms will vary according to the relative
precision assigned to inputs and hypotheses, respectively.
When a subject unexpectedly encounters a certain painful
stimulus for the first time, the ongoing hypothesis that the system
is healthy is quickly revised on meeting unambiguous sensory
evidence that departs from it. Given that the system has had no
previous exposure to the stimulus, sensory signals have higher
precision relative to prior hypotheses, and therefore a higher
impact on perception. This is why in cases of localized
dysfunction and acute pain, we find a high correlation between
pathophysiology and symptom perception.
However, for many chronic subjective symptoms, which often
involve central sensitization, somatization, aberrant nociceptive
amplification, or ambiguous, frequently shifting information, the
process can reverse. Here, the perception of symptoms shifts in
the direction of the hypotheses generated by the brain, which
explains the low correlation that we find between objective
pathophysiology and subjective experience across a number of
such chronic conditions.13 From a Bayesian perspective, chronic
pain reflects the high precision that is placed on hypotheses vis-a-
vis sensory evidence. Slight and harmless variations in in-
teroceptive inputs in certain contexts (which in healthy individuals
would be treated as “noise”) prompt the brain to mistakenly infer
pain as the cause of these inputs,20 and to feel pain accordingly.
Anxiety, fear, threat perception, and catastrophizing, emotional
states that often accompany this disorder, have the effect of
worsening symptoms by maintaining vigilance to predicted
pain.34
Furthermore, in the context of chronic pain, the brain does not
merely passively perceive pain, but can also play a part in its own
intensification. This is so because under the predictive processing
framework, another way of minimizing prediction error lies in the
generation of bodily action. If, in the context of perception, the
brain revises its predictions to match the input, in action, it
minimizes prediction error by modifying the inputs so that they
can fit the prediction.6,10 In a condition of chronic pain, the brain
may nonconsciously initiate visceral sensations (eg, stomach
tension) that match the hypothesis of being in pain. In all this, we
see the brain, in a context of precision imbalance, continuing to
perform its ordinary Bayesian task of minimizing prediction error
to conform inputs to predictions, even if at the detriment of
subjective well-being.20
The framework invites us to appreciate the salient role played
by the social context in shaping and reinforcing predictions of
symptoms. Knowledge of a drug’s side effects, the verbal
information about imminent pain delivered by a physician, or
a culturally specific way of attending to our body heighten the
precision of the hypothesis of impending symptoms, leading it to
dominate symptomperception. The so called “nocebo effects,” in
which negative symptoms attributed to medication arise in-
dependently of biological activity, fall within the same set of
processes.3,11,29
Importantly, the approach goes some way towards tran-
scending the artificial but pervasive distinction between
“explained” and “unexplained” symptoms in biomedicine (or
between “real” and “imaginary” illnesses). One important
upshot of the theory is that all symptoms are product of an
inferential process that is never strictly reducible to physiolog-
ical dysfunction and is sometimes only loosely related or
unrelated to it. “Explained” and “unexplained” symptoms thus
lie on a continuum, differing only in the extent to which they are
coupled to an organic disorder. Given that the same inferential
process is implicated in both cases, the theory also explains
why the so called “real” and “imaginary” symptoms seem to be
phenomenologically indistinguishable from the patient’s point
of view.30
4. Symptom relief and placebo effects
A very similar story, if in reverse, applies to the relief of symptoms.
From a Bayesian perspective, the experience of recovery is not
the direct consequence of the restoration of bodily function, but is
itself the process of inferring that certain interoceptive changes
are signs that this improvement is taking place. The ongoing
hypothesis that we are ill must be revised on meeting evidence
that the body is returning to a “healthy body condition.” This
revision of hypotheses, however, is usually slower or hard to
occur if the person is not given any external cues that amelioration
is underway. Without receiving this information, the brain might
explain away the variation in interoceptive input that follows an
effective medical intervention as mere “noise” and adheres to
a hypothesis of ongoing pain. Experiments in acute experimental
models conducted within the open-hidden paradigm in placebo
studies show this very clearly, for they demonstrate that patients
who are administered symptom-relieving drugs (eg, analgesics,
anxiolytics) in a covert manner tend to experience a much lower
relief than patients who are given treatment in full-view.4,5 The
medical ritual prompts the brain to interpret even small in-
teroceptive changes in the body as the consequence of healing,
and to experience relief accordingly. Such predictions are self-
fulfilling.1,7,18,19,32 Simultaneously, under precise predictions of
incoming health, the brain can also arrive at symptom relief
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through processes of active inference. The brain, in short, may
initiate healthful visceral sensations (eg, relaxing stomach
muscles) that conform to the hypothesis that one is returning to
a “healthy body condition”—all this with the purpose of fulfilling
the prediction and minimizing error.
Many elements of the therapeutic context can play a role in
enhancing predictions of well-being, especially in chronic
situations. Experiments have shown that care and supportive
verbal suggestions communicated by a trusted clinician are
central in eliciting placebo effects,25 as is the perceived value of
the treatment itself. For instance, inert treatments presented as
costly to patients tend to be more effective than treatments that
patients know are less expensive.14,23 Social learning–observing
first-hand the effects of a treatment on others–also greatly
contributes to the formation of placebo responses.12 Importantly,
recent evidence suggests that features of the therapeutic ritual
can be effective even when apprehended subliminally.22 This
evidence is fully compatible with the finding that patients can
receive benefit in an “open-label placebo” paradigm, in which
they are honestly told that they are receiving a placebo.8,24,26
From a predictive processing perspective, some of this response
is probably triggered because of unconscious predictions
sparked by the embodied assumption of medication taking21
and by being in a clinical environment associated with efficacy.
The response may also be related to inferences under ambiguity.
Two contradictory messages embedded in open-label placebos
—“this inert placebo pill may help; this placebo pill cannot
work”—may create heightened neurological, cognitive, and
embodied dissonance leading to nonconscious inferences that
disturb central sensitization.24
Obviously, positive predictions of relief are often insufficient to
lead to full or even partial recovery. Predictive processing explains
the reason why, in the presence of strong physiopathology,
placebo effects tend to be difficult to elicit. If a highly weighted
prediction of impending relief is met with strong sensory evidence
of the contrary, the brain will eventually infer that the body is still in
pain. In fact, therapeutic rituals alone tend not to work on
physiological conditions that lie outside the reach of the nervous
system, and are mostly effective on symptoms of self-appraisal
that are uncoupled from pathophysiology.31
Crucially, the predictive processing approach shows that
therapeutic ritual and active ingredients of the intervention, albeit
through different routes, act on the same inferential process
whereby we experience symptoms relief. The first strengthens
predictions of impending health by offering external evidence that
recovery is taking place (through the ritual drama, verbal
interaction, etc.). The second strengthens predictions of impend-
ing health by removing the source of nociceptive inputs, or, in the
case of symptom-relieving drugs, by stimulating neurotransmit-
ters that encode for the precision of top-down predictions.7 Given
that, whichever the route, the same basic inferential process lies
at the heart of symptom relief, the framework explains why
healing that is primarily related to a medical intervention (so called
“treatment effect”) and healing that is related to the therapeutic
ritual (so called “placebo effect”) seem to be as equally real from
the patient’s point of view.
5. Conclusions
Symptoms without a physical cause and relief through placebo
intervention are anomalies for the biomedical model of disease.
The Bayesian approach to perception explains and accommo-
dates these 2 phenomena. It exposes placebo and nocebo
effects, not as aberrant events, but as facets of the overall modus
operandi of the nervous system. It shows, also, that these act on
the same inferential processes as “real” disease and “real”
treatments do. The implication of this approach is that, to be truly
patient-focused, medicine must attend to the predictive process
that lies at the basis of symptom perception, and thereupon
evaluate what efficient courses of action can lead the brain to
predict the body’s health.
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